September 11, 2001, brought home to Americans and to people around the world the threat posed by global networks of terrorists. A variety of other problems pose similarly complex challenges. These include HIV/AIDS and other diseases; weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, and biological; the continuing conflicts in the Middle East and the Balkans, as well as tensions between India and Pakistan; global financial markets and the increasingly globalized economy; the Internet; the persistence of poverty; environmental threats such as climate change and collapse of global fisheries; ethnic conflicts; and failed states.

None of these problems can be managed by sovereign states acting alone, even by the sole superpower, the United States. All require cooperation of some sort among governments and the increasing number of non-state actors in the world; many require the active participation of ordinary citizens; some demand the establishment of new, international mechanisms for monitoring or the negotiation of new international rules; and most require the refinement of means for securing states’ compliance.

In short, there is a wide variety of international policy problems that require governance. Sometimes the need is truly global in scope as with terrorism, financial markets, HIV/AIDS and other public health threats, climate change, and weapons of mass destruction. In other cases, the governance problem is specific to a region of the world or group of countries, as with the need to manage a major river system such as the Danube, Rhine, or Mekong that flows through several countries, or a regional sea such as the Mediterranean. But what do we mean by governance and is the need for global governance increasing?

### What Is Global Governance?

In 1995 the Commission on Global Governance, an independent group of prominent international figures, formed to consider what reforms in modes of international cooperation were called for by global changes, and published a report on their five years of deliberations. The group included lead-
ers such as Oscar Arias, president of Costa Rica; Barber Conable, president of the World Bank and former U.S. congressman; Olara Otunnu, former foreign minister of Uganda; and Maurice Strong, former Canadian businessman and first executive director of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The commission defined governance as “the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal . . . as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest” (Commission on Global Governance 1995: 2).

How does governance relate to government? While clearly related, they are not identical. As James Rosenau (1992: 4) put it,

Both refer to purposive behavior, to goal-oriented activities, to systems of rule; but government suggests activities that are backed by formal authority, by police powers to insure the implementation of duly constituted policies, whereas governance refers to activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance. Governance, in other words, is a more encompassing phenomenon than government. It embraces governmental institutions, but it also subsumes informal, nongovernmental mechanisms whereby those persons and organizations within its purview move ahead, satisfy their needs, and fulfill their wants.

Thus, global governance is not global government; it is not a single world order; it is not a top-down, hierarchical structure of authority. It is the collection of governance-related activities, rules, and mechanisms, formal and informal, existing at a variety of levels in the world today. We refer to these as the “pieces of global governance.”

The Pieces of Global Governance

The pieces of global governance are the cooperative problem-solving arrangements and activities that states and other actors have put into place to deal with various issues and problems. They include international rules or laws, norms or “soft law,” and structures such as formal international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) as well as improvised arrangements that provide decisionmaking processes, information gathering and analytical functions, dispute settlement procedures, and operational capabilities for managing technical and development assistance programs, relief aid, and force deployments. In some instances the rules, norms, and structures are linked together in what some scholars refer to as international regimes to govern a particular problem such as nuclear weapons prolifera-
tion, whaling, trade, food aid, transportation, ozone, or telecommunications. (See Figure 1.1.)

**International Law**

The scope of what is generally known as public international law has expanded tremendously since the 1960s. Although the Statute of the International Court of Justice recognizes five sources of international law (treaties or conventions, customary practice, the writings of legal scholars, judicial decisions, and general principles of law), much of the growth has been in treaty law. Between 1951 and 1995, 3,666 new multilateral treaties were concluded (Ku 2001). They include the Vienna Convention on Treaties, environmental conventions such as those for ozone, climate change, and whaling, law of the sea, humanitarian law (the Geneva conventions), human rights law, trade law, arms control agreements, and intellectual property law. By far the largest number of new multilateral agreements deals with economic issues. Treaty-based law has been particularly valued because the process of negotiation now involves all affected countries.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Figure 1.1 Pieces of Global Governance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>International rules or laws</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>3000+ multilateral agreements</td>
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<td>Customary practices</td>
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<td>Judicial opinions</td>
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<td><strong>Norms or “soft law”</strong></td>
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<td>Some human rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Some labor rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Framework conventions on climate change and biodiversity</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Structures, formal and informal</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>IGOs, global, regional, other</td>
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<tr>
<td>International courts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global conferences</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group of 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs providing humanitarian relief, development aid, human rights monitoring</td>
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<td>Ad hoc conferences such as for landmines treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>International Regimes</strong></td>
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<td>Linked principles, norms, rules, decisionmaking structures for a given issue area such as trade, nuclear nonproliferation, food aid, transportation, telecommunications</td>
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Nonetheless, customary practice persists as an important source of new law, particularly because of the long time it takes to negotiate and bring into effect agreements involving large numbers of countries.

For purposes of global governance, one major limitation of public international law is that it applies only to states, except for war crimes and crimes against humanity. At present, except within the European Union (EU), multilateral agreements cannot be used directly to bind individuals, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), paramilitary forces, terrorists, or international criminals. They can, however, establish norms that states are expected to observe and, where possible, enforce against these nonstate actors.

Another problem in the eyes of many is the absence of international enforcement mechanisms and the role of self-interest in shaping states’ decisions about whether or not to accept treaties and other forms of international rules. International law has traditionally left states to use “self-help” means to secure compliance. In reality, the United Nations Charter and European Union treaties, for example, provide enforcement mechanisms, yet the threat of sanctions is not a key motivator for compliance with international rules. Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes (1995), instead, cite efficiency, interests, and norms as key factors and lack of capability or treaty ambiguity as principal sources of noncompliance. States often value a reputation for law-abiding behavior and desire the benefits of reciprocity (the “golden rule” of “doing unto others as you would have them do unto you”); they are generally inclined to comply with international law. Peer pressure from other states and domestic or transnational pressures from NGOs may induce compliance. For weaker and developing states, failure to comply can be a consequence of inadequate local expertise and governmental capacity to do what is required for compliance. In short, the “force” of international law often comes from the “felt need to coordinate activities . . . and to ensure stable and predictive patterns of behavior” and the reality is “imperfect, varied, and changing implementation and compliance,” with many factors affecting the extent to which states meet legal commitments (Jacobson and Weiss 1995: 122).

**International Norms or “Soft Law”**

Many international legal conventions set forth what are not in fact binding obligations for states, but rather norms or standards of behavior, sometimes referred to as “soft law.” Some human rights and labor rights, the concept of the global commons applied to the high seas, outer space, and polar regions, as well as the concept of sustainable development are all examples of such “soft law.” In environmental law, an initial framework convention often sets forth norms and principles that states agree on, such as those for ozone depletion, loss of biodiversity, and global climate change. As scien-
tific understanding of the problem improves and technology provides possible substitutes for ozone-depleting chemicals, for example, or carbon dioxide-producing energy sources, leading states, key corporations, and other interested actors may later come to agreement on specific, binding steps to be taken. Protocols are used to supplement the initial framework convention, and they are considered to form the “hard” law dealing with the issue.

### Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)

IGOs are organizations whose members include at least three states, that have activities in several states, and whose members are held together by a formal intergovernmental agreement. In 2003/04, the *Yearbook of International Organizations* identified about 238 IGOs. These organizations range in size from three members (North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]) to more than 190 members (Universal Postal Union [UPU]). Members may come from primarily one geographic region (Organization of American States [OAS]) or from all geographic regions (World Bank). Although some IGOs are designed to achieve a single purpose (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC]), others have been developed for multiple tasks (United Nations [UN]). Most IGOs are not global in membership, but regional where a commonality of interest motivates states to cooperate on issues directly affecting them. Among the universe of IGOs, most are small in membership and designed to address specific functions. Most have been formed since World War II, and among the different regions, Europe has the densest concentration of IGOs (see Figure 1.2).

IGOs are recognized subjects of international law with separate standing from their member states. In a 1949 advisory opinion, *Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations*, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concluded,

> The Organization [the United Nations] was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of international personality and the capacity to operate upon an international plane. It is at present the supreme type of international organization, and it could not carry out the intentions of its founders if it was devoid of international personality.

IGOs serve many diverse functions, including collecting information and monitoring trends (United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP]), delivering services and aid (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]), providing forums for intergovernmental bargaining (European Union [EU]), and settling disputes (International Court of Justice and World Trade Organization [WTO]). IGOs are instrumental in forming stable habits of cooperation through regular meetings, information
gathering and analysis, and dispute settlement as well as operational activities (see Figure 1.3).

Yet how IGOs serve their various functions varies across organizations. Organizations differ in membership. They vary by the scope of the subject and rules. They differ in the amount of resources available and by level and degree of bureaucratization.

Why do states join such organizations? Why do they choose to act and to cooperate through formal IGOs? Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal (1998: 4–5) answer these questions by suggesting that “IOs [intergovernmental organizations] allow for the centralization of collective activities through a concrete and stable organizational structure and a supportive administrative apparatus. These increase the efficiency of collective activities and enhance the organization’s ability to affect the understandings, environment, and interests of states.” Thus, states join to participate in a stable negotiating forum, permitting rapid reactions in times of crisis. They join IGOs to negotiate and implement agreements that reflect self- and community interests. They participate to provide

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<td>Global</td>
<td>UN</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
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<td>Regional</td>
<td>ASEAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subregional</td>
<td>Mekong Group</td>
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<td>Gulf Cooperative Council</td>
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<th>Purpose</th>
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<td>General</td>
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<td>Specialized</td>
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mechanisms for dispute resolution. They join to take advantage of central-
ized organization in the implementation of collective tasks. By participat-
ing, they agree to shape international debate on important issues and forge
critical norms of behavior. Yet states still maintain their sovereignty and
varying degrees of independence of action.

IGOs not only create opportunities for their member states, but they
also exercise influence and impose constraints on their member states’ poli-
cies and processes. IGOs affect member states by setting international and,
hence, national agendas and forcing governments to take positions on
issues. They subject states’ behavior to surveillance through information
sharing. They encourage the development of specialized decisionmaking
and implementation processes to facilitate and coordinate IGO participa-
tion. They embody or facilitate the creation of principles, norms, and rules
of behavior with which states must align their policies if they wish to bene-
fit from reciprocity. For example, Chapter 9 explores how China’s admis-
sion to the World Trade Organization affects its national policies and
requires extensive governmental reforms.

The “power” of IGOs is limited in terms of their ability to enforce
decisions, except in specific cases such as the EU, which has supranational
authority over member states in many policy domains. Most IGO actions
are, in fact, recommendations. Their effectiveness lies in actors’ willing-
ness to make and comply with commitments. Their suasion is largely
moral. Peer pressure can be powerful, however, in pushing states to act in

<table>
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<th>Figure 1.3 IGO Functions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Informational—gathering, analyzing, and disseminating data</td>
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<td>• Forum—providing place for exchange of views and decision-making</td>
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<td>• Normative—defining standards of behavior</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Rule-creating—drafting legally binding treaties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rule-supervisory—monitoring compliance with rules, settling disputes, taking enforcement measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Operational—allocating resources, providing technical assistance and relief, deploying forces</td>
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ways that others wish, and IGOs are prime arenas for exercising peer pressure and moral suasion.

Most countries, nevertheless, perceive that there are benefits to being participants in IGOs and international regimes even if they are targets of criticism and condemnation in international forums over long periods, or not receiving as many benefits as they might hope. South Africa never withdrew from the UN over the long years when it was repeatedly condemned for its policies of apartheid. Iraq did not withdraw from the UN in protest over more than a decade of stringent sanctions. China spent fourteen years negotiating the terms of its entry into the international trade system and undertaking changes in laws and policies required to bring itself into compliance with WTO rules. Ten countries joined the EU in 2004, despite the extensive and costly changes required.

Although the earliest IGOs were established in the nineteenth century, there was a veritable explosion of IGOs in the twentieth century, as discussed in Chapter 3. Major power wars (especially World Wars I and II), economic development, technological innovation, and the growth of the state system, especially with decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, provided impetus for creating many IGOs. Since the 1960s, there has also been a growing phenomenon of IGOs creating other IGOs. One study noted that IGO birthrates “correlate positively with the number of states in the international system,” but found death rates of IGOs low (Cupitt et al. 1997: 16). Of thirty-four IGOs functioning in 1914, eighteen were still operational at the end of the twentieth century. The Cold War’s end brought the death of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, both Soviet bloc institutions. The creation of the UN in 1945 led to the demise of the League of Nations. The authoritative source for all data on international organizations, both IGOs and NGOs, is the Union of International Associations (UIA) located in Brussels and UIA’s Yearbook of International Organizations. Figure 1.4 shows the evolution in numbers of international organizations.

### Nongovernmental Organizations

NGOs are private voluntary organizations whose members are individuals or associations that come together to achieve a common purpose. Some organizations are formed to advocate a particular cause such as human rights, peace, or environmental protection. Others are established to provide services such as disaster relief, humanitarian aid in war-torn societies, or development assistance. Some are in reality government-organized groups (dubbed GONGOs). There is a key distinction between not-for-profit groups (the vast majority) and for-profit corporations. NGOs are increasingly active today at all levels of human society and governance, from local or grassroots communities to national and inter-
national politics. National-level groups are often called interest or pressure groups, and many of them are now linked to counterpart groups in other countries through transnational networks or federations. International NGOs, like IGOs, may draw their members from one region or several regions, and they may have very specific functions or be multifunctional.

The estimates of numbers of NGOs vary enormously. The *Yearbook of International Organizations* identifies over 6,500 nongovernmental organizations that have an international dimension either in terms of membership or commitment to conduct activities in several states. Exclusively national NGOs number in the millions. Many large international NGOs (INGOs) are transnational federations involving formal, long-term links among national groups. Examples include the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Oxfam, CARE, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), World Wildlife Fund, Transparency International (the leading NGO fighting corruption worldwide), Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Save the Children. An example of an INGO
that is not a federation of country chapters would be Greenpeace, which claims 4.1 million members worldwide.

NGOs’ governance functions parallel many functions provided by IGOs. They create and mobilize global networks, gathering information on local conditions and mobilizing pressures both within states and transnationally. In fact, they have become key sources of information and technical expertise on a wide variety of international issues from the environment to human rights. They participate at least indirectly in IGO-sponsored conferences, raising new issues, submitting documents, and disseminating their expertise. In some instances, such as with the Convention to Ban Landmines, they may be direct contributors of treaty language. They educate delegates, expand policy options, and bring parties together in third-party venues. They play increasingly important governance roles in monitoring implementation of human rights norms and environmental regulations. They enhance public participation, mobilizing individuals and groups to undertake political action, developing networks, monitoring the actions taken and government and corporate behavior.

As a result of global trends to privatize activities previously controlled by governments, NGOs are playing an ever-increasing role. Services once provided by governments or IGOs are being contracted out to private, non-governmental organizations. They deliver disaster relief; run refugee camps; provide microcredit loans to poor women and men in countries such as Bangladesh; administer development programs; attempt to contain the international spread of disease; and work to clean up the environment. They also have promoted corporate codes of conduct such as the Valdez Principles (a set of environmental principles) and consumer labeling such as “rugmark” (for carpets made with child labor). NGO roles are discussed further in Chapter 6.

International Regimes
Scholars have developed the concept of international regimes to understand governance for a given issue area such as nuclear weapons proliferation, whaling, European transboundary air pollution, food aid, trade, telecommunications, and transportation, where principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures are linked to one another. Where an international regime exists, participating states and other international actors recognize the existence of certain obligations and feel compelled to honor them. Because this is “governance without government,” they comply because they accept the legitimacy of the rules and underlying norms, and the validity of the decisionmaking procedures. They expect other states and actors also to comply and to utilize dispute settlement procedures to resolve conflicts. Key characteristics of international regimes are their association with a specific issue area and the links among the constituent elements.
International regimes encompass rules and norms, as well as the practices of actors that show both how their expectations converge and their acceptance of and compliance with rules. IGO decisionmaking procedures, bureaucracy, budget, headquarters building, and legal personality may be required (or established) within a given issue area, but by themselves, individual IGOs do not constitute a regime. Some issues such as nuclear accidents that trigger widespread nuclear fallout do not need a formal organization that functions regardless of whether there is an accident. Ad hoc arrangements for decisionmaking and action when an accident occurs can be coupled with rules and norms. Nuclear weapons proliferation, however, benefits from the inspection machinery and safeguards systems of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and IAEA’s technical assistance programs to non-nuclear weapon countries for developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

**Ad Hoc Arrangements**

In situations where an existing IGO does not provide a suitable forum for dealing with a particular problem and a new IGO is not needed, states and other actors may create an ad hoc arrangement. The pattern can be best illustrated with three examples. The Group of 7 (G-7), for example, began in an ad hoc fashion in the mid-1970s when summit meetings of governmental leaders were not yet common practice and major changes in international economic relations suggested the value of periodic, informal gatherings. These later evolved into a regular arrangement, but not a formal IGO.

When Canadian Prime Minister Lloyd Axworthy decided to negotiate a convention banning antipersonnel landmines in 1996, none of the existing IGO structures such as the UN Conference on Disarmament and the UN General Assembly seemed appropriate for achieving this goal in a short period of time. Instead, Axworthy convened a special conference in Ottawa in December 1997 for the sole purpose of securing agreement on a total ban by the largest possible number of countries. In the mid-1990s, ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda prompted the UN Security Council to create ad hoc war crimes tribunals to bring those responsible to justice. This gave impetus to the creation of a permanent International Criminal Court.

**Global Conferences**

During the 1990s, the United Nations convened nine global conferences on economic and social matters, following a similar series in the 1970s and 1980s. Some were designated world summits rather than global conferences because they included meetings of heads of state and government. NGO participation in parallel conferences grew exponentially. Each succes-
sive conference exhorted the UN itself and member states to give priority to another set of issues such as environmental protection and sustainable development, women’s rights, the rights of the girl child, human settlements, food supply, or the elimination of poverty. As one observer has asked, are these “media events or genuine diplomacy?” (Fomerand 1996) What purposes do they serve? How do they fit into the pieces of global governance?

Conferences like the Summit for Children (1990), the Earth Summit in Rio (1992), or the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995) have become an important part of the global political processes for addressing interdependence issues, for seeking ways to improve the lives and well-being of humans, and for strengthening other pieces of governance. They also serve to raise awareness of interdependence issues; galvanize the creation, dissemination, and sharing of knowledge; create new norms and new international law; create new structures; and define global political priorities. Cumulatively, the global conferences have also bolstered understanding of the linkages among issues of environmental protection, equal rights (especially for women), elimination of poverty, improved access to economic resources, sharing of knowledge and technology, and participation of local communities.

Global conferences have spawned complex multilateral diplomacy with NGOs, scientific experts, corporations, and interested individuals trying to influence conference outcomes. They have raised important issues of who gets to participate and in what ways. Often the results are disappointing to those most concerned about the issues because they may represent the least common denominator of agreement among the large number of participants, of whom only states, however, actually have a formal say.

Private Governance

Private governance is a growing, but little studied phenomenon. Although the very meaning of the term is controversial, it involves authoritative decisionmaking in areas that once were part of national legal frameworks, the government, the sovereign state, or the public sector (Hall and Biersteker 2002: 203. Examples include international accounting standards; the private bond-rating agencies such as Moody’s Investors Service, whose rules can shape government actions through the threatened drop in a country’s rating; International Chamber of Commerce rules and actions; private industry governance such as the Worldwide Responsible Apparel Manufacturing Principles and the Forest Stewardship Council, or labor standards within a single multinational firm such as Nike or Ford.

Cyberspace is governed by hybrid institutions, which presently involves a strong dose of private authority. Private firms are attempting to establish enforceable intellectual property rules for music, software, and
published materials available on the Internet. Visa and MasterCard have created the Secure Electronic Transaction Protocol to enable bank card transactions to be made securely via the Internet. As Debora Spar (1999: 47) notes about this new electronic environment,

International organizations lack the power to police cyberspace; national governments lack the authority; and the slow pace of interstate agreement is no match for the rapid-fire rate of technological change. If rules are to emerge along the Internet, private entities will have to create them . . . [including] University consortia and library groups . . . industry associations such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Business Software Alliance.

Private authorities are neither inherently good nor bad. “What is evident, though,” Spar (48) says, “is that private entities will play an ever-increasing role in the development and management of electronic interaction . . . . They will assume quasi-governmental functions in many instances, regulating activity in their particular spheres through a combination of formal and informal rules, administrative and technical means.” The mix of public and private governance required by the Internet’s growth is explored further in Chapter 12.

An interesting hybrid of public and private governance is illustrated by the World Commission on Dams, composed of representatives from government, private industry, and NGOs. Its function is to establish guidelines for decisionmaking on large dam construction.

These various pieces of global governance are not well organized. They vary in scope, effectiveness, and durability. In subsequent chapters we shall be exploring them in more depth and specificity. We turn now, however, to identify the key actors in global governance.

### Actors in Global Governance

The complexity of global governance is a function not only of many pieces, but also of many actors that are frequently linked in transnational and trans-governmental networks. Such networks have become increasingly dense since the 1970s when Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1971) first pointed out the importance of regular interactions across national boundaries of governmental and nongovernmental actors. Such scholars as Anne-Marie Slaughter (1997), Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995), and James Rosenau (1997) have explored the existence of these networks and their policy impact.

### States

States continue to be key actors in global governance, creating many of the pieces and carrying out many of the activities. States alone have sovereign-
States create IGOs and determine what actions they can or cannot take; they create international law and norms and determine their effectiveness through their compliance or failure to comply. Because the more than 190 states in the international system vary so dramatically, however, their relative importance in global governance will vary. A large, powerful hegemonic state is more likely to play a greater role in international politics than are smaller, less powerful states. The United States, in particular, used its dominant position after World War II to shape much of the structure and rules of global governance. At that point, IGOs offered a way to create structures compatible with American notions of political order and through which to promote U.S. political and economic interests. Although support for such institutions was not necessarily assured, governmental and public commitment were generally strong. The predominance of Americans in many secretariats and the relatively large share of operating and program funding contributed by the United States reinforced American influence over policies and programs of many IGOs.

Today as the sole superpower, however, the United States cannot shape global governance alone, as even a hegemonic state has to act in coordination with others. In the United Nations system on peace and security issues, that means primarily in coordination with the other four permanent members of the Security Council: Russia, Great Britain, China, and France. In international economic governance, the United States works most closely with the G-7 that includes Germany, Japan, Italy, Britain, France, and Canada. Yet on a number of issues such as the International Criminal Court and the Convention to Ban Landmines, large numbers of other countries have demonstrated a willingness to act even in the face of U.S. opposition. We explore the fluctuations in U.S. support for multilateralism further in Chapter 7.

Middle-power states play a particularly critical role, not as individual states but often acting in concert in the United Nations and other IGOs. Thus, states such as Canada, Australia, Norway, Sweden, Argentina, Brazil, India, and Nigeria are known for their commitment to multilateralism, ability to forge compromises, and support for reform in the international system. The essence of middle-powers’ role lies in the importance of secondary players in international politics, as both followers and leaders.

For the large number of less developed, smaller, and weaker states, power and influence generally come only insofar as they are able to form coalitions. IGOs provide arenas for this and also for international recognition and legitimacy. Through their collective efforts, small and developing countries have endeavored to shape the agendas, priorities, and programs of many IGOs over the last forty years, with varying degrees of success.

Although states continue to be major actors in global governance, as Jessica Mathews (1997: 50) so aptly describes, “National governments . . .

Understanding Global Governance
are sharing powers—including political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty—with businesses, with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizens groups. The steady concentration of power in the hands of states that began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia is over, at least for a while.” Power, indeed, is less concentrated in states and has diffused to the other actors in global governance.

**IGO**s

In considering the significance of IGOs in shaping global governance, we focus not on the structural attributes and programs but on the organizations as actors. This means the IGO officials who play key roles in getting states to act, coordinating the efforts of different groups, providing the diplomatic skills to secure agreements, and ensuring programs’ effectiveness. These officials include the UN secretary-general and undersecretaries-general; the directors-general of organizations such as the World Health Organization and World Trade Organization; the UN High Commissioners for Refugees and Human Rights; the UN secretary-general’s special representatives for Afghanistan, for child soldiers, or for Kosovo; the president of the World Bank; the executive director of the International Monetary Fund; the president of the European Commission; and the country representatives of the UN Development Programme, to provide just a few illustrations.

Stories are legion about the roles key individuals holding IGO office have played in achieving international trade agreements, ceasefires in wars, and governments’ agreement to revise their development strategies to meet international guidelines. Individuals and organizations, then, serve as key actors (or agents) in global governance.

**NGO**s

Like IGOs, NGOs are both pieces of governance and key actors. We have discussed a number of the roles they play. The growth of NGOs and NGO networks in the 1990s has been a major factor in their increasing involvement in governance at all levels from global to local. In addition to the 6,500 or so internationally active NGOs, there are literally millions of small grassroots NGOs in countries around the world. Women have been particularly active in organizing many of these. One group that gained prominence in the late 1970s was the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo—the mothers of young men and women who disappeared during the period of Argentinian military dictatorship. The majority of such groups are not part of formal networks, but may have informal links, for example, to international human rights or environmental groups from which they may get funding for local programs or training assistance. For governance purposes, these grassroots groups play key roles in activities such as promoting population control, empowerment of women, health care, and environmental protection.
NGOs come in such a variety of forms, with such a variety of emphases, that there is a new group of acronyms that explain subtle differences (see Figure 1.5).

We explore the diversity and activities of NGOs further in Chapter 6. Unlike IGOs, however, NGOs have no legal standing or personality in international law. Thus, it is not surprising that the United Nations system has had difficulty incorporating them into its functioning. Although NGOs operate at the international level in a legal vacuum, in most states NGOs do have legal standing and are subject to national laws and regulations.

Experts

In a world whose problems seem to grow steadily more complex, knowledge and expertise are critical to governance efforts. There is a need to understand the science behind environmental problems such as climate change, ozone depletion, or declining fish stocks in order to consider policy options. Cost-effective alternatives have to be developed for fuels that emit carbon dioxide and ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons if there is going to be political support for making policy changes and new rules. Thus, experts from different countries’ governmental agencies, research institutes, private industry, or universities have increasingly been drawn into international efforts to deal with different issues. Often these experts may be part of transnational networks and participate in international conferences and negotiations, laying out the state of scientific knowledge, for example, framing issues for debate, or proposing specific solutions. Scholars have

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**Figure 1.5 Varieties of NGOs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGO</td>
<td>antigovernmental organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANGO</td>
<td>transnational NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GONGO</td>
<td>government-organized NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRINGO</td>
<td>government-regulated and initiated NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINGO</td>
<td>business and industry NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DONGO</td>
<td>donor-organized NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODONGO</td>
<td>donor-dominated NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODANGO</td>
<td>ODA-financed NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAMINGO</td>
<td>flashy-minded NGOs (representing rich countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>people’s organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONGO</td>
<td>operational NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANGO</td>
<td>advocacy NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSMO</td>
<td>transnational social movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSM</td>
<td>global social movements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
coined the phrase “epistemic communities” to identify networks of knowledge-based experts.

Global Policy Networks
Experts may also be among the actors in global policy networks that link key individuals in government agencies, IGOs, corporations, professional associations, and NGOs. In 1999, surveys by the World Bank identified about fifty such networks that ranged in focus from fisheries to global climate change to HIV/AIDS. The loose alliances of a broad range of participants “join together to achieve what none can accomplish on its own” (Reincke 1999/2000: 44). Such groups take advantage of the ability to communicate and travel rapidly among distant parts of the globe to promote collaboration, tap expertise, and disseminate new knowledge. The networks have the advantage of flexibility often lacking in traditional governmental, IGO, and corporate bureaucracies. One of the oldest global policy networks is the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research founded in 1971 to coordinate and finance sixteen agricultural research centers around the world. The UN’s leadership has begun to think more strategically about such networks. The secretary-general’s Millennium Report points out, “Mobilizing the skills and other resources of diverse global actors . . . may increasingly involve forming loose and temporary global networks that cut across national, institutional and disciplinary lines” (Annan 2000). We shall examine the roles of experts and global policy networks further in Chapter 6.

Multinational Corporations (MNCs)
MNCs are a particular form of nongovernmental actor organized to conduct for-profit business transactions and operations across the borders of three or more states. Multinational corporations can take many different forms, from licensing local industries to providing foreign suppliers, contract manufacturing, turnkey projects, manufacturing, and assembly operations. What they share in common is that they are companies based in one state with affiliated branches or subsidiaries and activities in other states. They have the ability to invest capital and thus to create jobs, influence political actors, offer incentives to host governments, lobby for changes in state laws, and threaten to move jobs and investment elsewhere should the conditions not be conducive to profitable business.

Since the 1970s, MNCs have been increasingly recognized as significant international actors, controlling resources far greater than those of many states. The world’s largest MNCs account for four-fifths of world industrial output. In the 1990s, foreign direct investment grew rapidly, although it was still highly concentrated and distributed unevenly in Europe, the United States, Latin America (particularly Brazil and Mexico),
and East and Southeast Asia (especially China). As actors in global governance, MNCs have “profoundly altered the structure and functioning of the global economy” (Gilpin 2001: 290). By choosing where to invest or not to invest, MNCs shape the economic development opportunities of individual communities, countries, and entire regions such as Africa, where little foreign investment takes place compared to East Asia. By moving production from communities such as Peoria, Illinois, or Dayton, Ohio, to Mexico or Malaysia, MNCs’ activities can benefit or hurt both developed and developing countries.

Globalization of markets and production in industries such as automobiles challenges corporate leaders and managers to govern these complex structures and challenges states and local governments experiencing a keen loss of connection and control to these larger corporate networks. Corporate choices about investment have changed the landscape of development assistance. Far more funding for development today comes from private investment capital than from bilateral, government-to-government aid, or multilateral aid through the UN and other IGOs. In short, MNCs’ activities have raised a number of governance questions: How can MNCs’ activities best be regulated—through new forms of international rules or through private mechanisms? How can they be mobilized for economic development in collaboration with international agencies and NGOs? How can less developed countries be assured that powerful MNCs will not interfere in their domestic affairs, challenge their sovereignty, destroy their resources and environment, and relegate them to permanent dependency? MNCs are particularly important actors in addressing trade, labor, and environmental issues. Their participation has been critical, for example, in efforts to address ozone depletion and global warming. They are also targets of NGO activism as discussed further in Chapter 6.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has been a champion of new mechanisms to regulate corporate behavior and to engage MNCs as positive contributors to global governance. In 1999, Annan broke new ground for the UN by convening a meeting with world business leaders and exhorting them to embrace the UN Global Compact whose nine principles cover human rights, labor, and the environment. Companies that participate must submit online updates of their progress for NGOs to scrutinize, thus involving NGOs in policing MNC compliance. This innovation is discussed further in Chapter 9.

The various actors in global governance cannot be analyzed in isolation from each other. Each plays key roles in efforts to deal with various issues and problems. Sometimes, they compete with each other for scarce resources, international standing, and legitimacy. At other times, their activities complement one another. In many instances, they are linked in
complex networks. Subsequent chapters will explore the relationships among various actors in global governance.

**An Increasing Need for Global Governance?**
The simple answer to this question is yes, given the necessity of curbing terrorism, blocking the international flow of disease, crime, and drugs, controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, reducing barriers to trade, alleviating poverty, ensuring environmental protection, keeping the peace after intrastate conflicts, promoting human rights, and other issues of global concern. There is a growing agenda of international challenges and “such globalizing forces as the information and communications revolutions not only propel more challenges to center stage but also rewrite the roles of various protagonists. This profoundly reshapes the ways and means of problem solving” (Simmons and de Jonge Oudraat 2001: vii). Globalization is playing a major role in shrinking the planet, proliferating issues, and changing the roles of key actors. The Cold War’s end contributed also to increased needs for governance. The emergence of transnational civil society and the contested nature of state sovereignty likewise factor into the rising need for global governance.

**Globalization**
In the 1970s, many academics identified trends of increasing trade and other links among states as evidence of growing interdependence. But by the 1980s and 1990s, clearly something more fundamental was happening than a mere interconnectedness among states and between states and individuals. International interdependence has been around for centuries and there have been previous periods of globalization. The contemporary form is unprecedented, however, in the degree to which markets, cultures, peoples, and states are being linked together. Globalization is “enabling individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before” (Friedman 1999: 7–8). It has spurred the proliferating networks of NGOs, terrorists, drug traffickers, financial markets, and empowered individuals.

Globalization challenges the assertion by many international relations scholars, most notably by realists and neorealists, that states are still the primary actors in international politics. In its broadest iteration, globalization refers to the “emergence and spread of a supraterritorial dimension of social relations” (Scholte 1996: 36). More specifically,

It denotes a shift in the spatial form of human organization and activity to transcontinental or interregional patterns of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power. It involves a stretching and deepening of social relations and institutions across space and time such that, on the one hand,
Globalization affects all spheres of human activity—economic, social, cultural, technological, environmental, and political—but it is not necessarily inevitable; change is not necessarily linear; and not all peoples or areas of the world are equally affected.

Globalization encompasses two simultaneous, yet contradictory patterns in world politics. One involves greater integration and interdependence between people and states, between states and other states, and between states and international bodies. This has been facilitated particularly by the communications revolution and by the preeminence of two core philosophies, economic liberalism and democracy. Economic liberalism emphasizes the role of the private sector over the state (that is, the government) in economic life. The demise of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union discredited socialist economic systems and brought down many barriers to the movement of goods, communications, and people, while economic difficulties in many less developed countries (LDCs) with state-dominated economies forced them to liberalize and privatize, often under the pressure of International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions. Consequently, since the mid-1980s, many former socialist states as well as developing countries have changed their economic policies, opened their borders to trade and investment, and become more integrated into the global economic system. Likewise, democratization spread to all regions of the globe in the 1980s and 1990s. From Latin America to Eastern Europe, and from the former Soviet Union to Africa and Asia, many authoritarian governments have been forced to open the political process to competing political parties, to adopt international human rights norms, to hold free elections, and to curb corruption. In many cases democratization and economic liberalism have been linked as integrative forces.

The integrative side of globalization is contradicted by disintegrative tendencies. Globalization “divides, fragments, and polarizes” (Cerny 1996: 8). As James Mittelman (1996: 18) laments,

Globalization sets in train conflicts among competing capitalisms, generates deeper or reconfigured intraregional disparities, engenders interregional rivalries among neomercantilist coalitions, and has combined with local forces to consign, at the end of this millennium, 265 million people on one continent [Africa] to poverty, with little hope for escape in sight. The foremost contradiction of our time is the conflict between the zones of humanity integrated in the global division of labor and those excluded from it.
Many weak states have been unable to accommodate technological changes and the challenges of more open economies that make them vulnerable to competition and exploitation. Weak states may also be unable to provide the necessary public goods. The resulting disjuncture between the states’ persistence as central structures of the international system and an eroding loyalty and confidence of individuals in the institutions of the state has contributed to the resurgence of ethnic and religious identities, ethnic conflicts, and further weakening, if not failure, of some states. The disintegrative tendencies of globalization affect both states’ and individuals’ perceptions of uncontrollable global processes. No longer are territorial states necessarily the central governing units in the international system. Global financial markets, transnational policy networks, and multinational corporations provide collective goods and elements of governance. Individuals themselves are increasingly alienated as they become further removed from political institutions that lack democratic accountability, or worry about a homogenization of cultures and declining value of labor in global markets.

Measuring the extent and depth of globalization has proven a difficult task. A. T. Kearney has constructed a Globalization Index, breaking down the phenomenon into several components, including level of the flow of goods and services across national boundaries; financial transactions; personal contacts across borders; political engagement; and technology. Of sixty-two countries covered by the index, those with the highest globalization score in 2003 were Ireland, Switzerland, Sweden, Singapore, and Netherlands. The index affirms more global countries have greater income inequality than less global countries. Yet technological and personal integration continue strongly, even when economic integration is low. Kearney (2003: 72) concludes, “Political engagement has expanded because the benefits of multilateral cooperation still outweigh the costs of going it alone.” Yet for this measure of globalization, states serve as the basic unit of analysis, and key aspects such as the spread of culture, ideas, and networks cannot be easily quantified.

More important than measuring the levels of globalization are the challenges globalization poses for governance. As scholars Keohane and Nye (2000: 1) note, for example, “Unless some aspects of globalization can be effectively governed, it may not be sustainable in its current form. Complete laissez faire was not a viable option during earlier periods of globalization and is not likely to be now.” The 1999 Human Development Report (United Nations Development Programme 1999: 2) argues, “Today’s globalization is being driven by market expansion—opening national borders to trade, capital, information—outpacing governance of these markets and their repercussions for people. More progress has been made in norms, standards, policies and institutions for open global markets than for people
and their rights.” The question is not will globalization be governed, but rather, how will globalization be governed? UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2000: 6) puts it more bluntly: “The central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world’s people, instead of leaving billions of them behind in squalor.”

Globalization has both coincided with and contributed to the changed international political environment resulting from the Cold War’s end, the growth of transnational civil society, and shifts in the nature of state sovereignty.

- **The Cold War’s End**

The end of the Cold War was brought about by both political changes toward democratization and economic changes toward liberalization of the economy in the Soviet Union. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 symbolized the end of the Cold War, and two years later the Soviet Union itself disintegrated into fifteen separate, independent states. As Thomas Friedman (1999: 8) has noted, “The Cold War system was characterized by one overarching feature—division . . . symbolized by a single word: the wall . . . . The globalization system is a bit different. It also has one overarching feature—integration . . . characterized by a single word: the Web.” The Cold War’s end marked the ending of one historical era and the beginning of another. The international system shifted from a bipolar structure to a post–Cold War structure that was simultaneously unipolar and a nonpolar, networked system of a globalized world.

At the outset, some suggested that history itself was at an end with the triumph of liberal capitalism (Fukuyama 1989) and the end of ideological competition, but those high expectations have not been borne out. Instead, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and end of the Cold War system revived ethnic rivalries and conflicts in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus, Balkans, and elsewhere, leading some to postulate a clash of civilizations as the new source of enduring conflicts in international politics (Huntington 1993). Although democracy and economic liberalism are now largely unchallenged and the United States is the sole superpower, the Cold War’s end produced neither peace nor stability, but a new series of governance challenges. The United Nations and regional IGOs, states, and NGOs have been challenged as never before to deal with ethnic and other intrastate conflicts, weak and failed states, genocide and ethnic cleansing, and the complex humanitarian disasters resulting from these problems.

- **Emergent Transnational Civil Society**

Contributing to the Cold War’s end and benefiting from both increased democratization and accelerating globalization is the growth of civil society within many countries and transnationally. First, a word about definition. There is a common tendency to equate NGOs with civil society, but the lat-
ter is really a broader concept, encompassing all organizations and associations that exist outside of the state and the market (i.e., government and business). It includes not just advocacy groups but also associations of professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and scientists, along with labor unions, chambers of commerce, religious groups, ethnic associations, cultural groups, sporting associations, and political parties. The key distinction between NGOs and civil society groups is their links to citizens. Many NGOs are elite-run groups with tenuous links to citizens on whose behalf they claim to act. Especially in developing and newly democratizing countries, grassroots and national NGOs may depend on international funding. Like NGOs, civil society is neither inherently good nor bad. People work together to advance both nefarious and worthy ends.

The spread of democracy to many corners of the globe has bolstered the growth of civil societies in countries where restrictions on citizens’ groups have been lifted. Civil society groups communicate with each other domestically and cross-nationally, creating new coalitions from the local to the global. These “networks of knowledge and action” (Lipschutz 1992: 390) are unconstrained by geographic borders and largely beyond states’ control. Transnational civil society groups permeate numerous issue areas, including the environment, human rights, technology, economic development, and security. Their demands for representation in processes of global governance contribute to the increased need to reform existing international institutions and to find new ways to incorporate actors other than states in governance.

■ Contested Nature of Sovereignty

These trends pose direct challenges to state sovereignty. The norm that states enjoy internal autonomy and cannot be subjected to external authority has been the bedrock of the Westphalian state system that has persisted from 1648 to the present. Some theorists focus on the erosion of sovereignty, suggesting that it may at one time have been absolute, but is compromised by states’ own weaknesses, by external influences such as flow from globalization or the development of international human rights norms, or other actors such as MNCs, NGOs, and global financial markets (Jackson 1990; Strange 1996). Others see sovereignty as always having been contested—for example, from within by ethnic groups seeking autonomy or self-determination (their own sovereignty)—and, hence, it varies across time, place, and issues (Krasner 1999; Rosenau 1997).

Over time, then, the nature of sovereignty has changed with the blurring of the lines between domestic and foreign issues, contributing further to the increased need for pieces of global governance. The acceleration of globalization, the rise of powerful nonstate actors, and the emergence of transnational civil society all undermine state sovereignty. Globalization is linking issues and actors together in complex new ways, where economic,
humanitarian, health, and environmental problems respect no state bound-
aries. “Small events in one place can have catalytic effects, so that conse-
quences later and elsewhere are vast” (Keohane and Nye 2000: 11). Viruses
like SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) move around the world in
a matter of hours, thanks to air travel. “New players, thorny problems,
spillover effects, and the magnitude of cross-border flows together inflate
the difficulty of coherent action at almost all levels of international affairs.
. . . At the same time, these offshoots of escalating interdependence strongly
influence the direction in which globalization will move—either toward
tighter teamwork in meeting multiple challenges or toward division. . . . the
stakes are rising” (Simmons and de Jonge Oudraat 2001: 8). The various
processes for dealing with these challenges are predominantly multilateral
in character. Therefore we turn now to a brief examination of the nature of
multilateral diplomacy and practice.

Processes of Global Governance: Multilateralism Matters
Multilateral negotiations have become “management tools in international
politics” (Hampson 1995: 6) and a key variable in global governance out-
comes. They are “the diplomatic bargaining processes through which the
international community confers political legitimacy or comes to accept . . .
[generalized] principles” (Hampson 1995: 3). Therefore, understanding the
nature of multilateral diplomacy is key to understanding how IGOs func-
tion, how NGOs have become involved in governance processes, and how
different kinds of outcomes (from degrees of success to failure) come
about. What differentiates multilateral diplomacy, however, from tradition-
al bilateral diplomacy other than just the numbers of participants?

John Ruggie (1993: 8) has stated, “At its core, multilateralism refers to
coordinating relations among three or more states in accordance with cer-
tain principles.” Thus relationships are defined by agreed-upon rules, prin-
ciples, and perhaps by organizations. Participants expect that outcomes will
yield “diffuse reciprocity” (Keohane 1984) or roughly equal benefits over
time. For example, the principle of nondiscrimination or most-favored-
nation (MFN) governing the global trade system prohibits countries from
discriminating against imports from other countries that produce the same
product. In collective security arrangements, participants must respond to
an attack on one as if it were an attack on all. By contrast, bilateralism is
expected to provide specific reciprocity and roughly balanced (but not nec-
essarily equal) exchanges by each party at all times.

Complex Diplomacy
Prior to the twentieth century, there was very little multilateralism. As we
will discuss in Chapter 3, the nineteenth century was marked by the devel-
opment of a number of public international unions and river commissions.
The Concert of Europe provided a series of periodic gatherings of great (European) powers. Twentieth-century diplomacy saw the accelerated trend from bilateral to multilateral diplomacy to institutions, especially formal organizations, and the growth of conference diplomacy.

What makes multilateralism at the beginning of the twenty-first century different from multilateralism at the end of World War II is its complexity. There are now literally scores of participants. States alone have almost quadrupled in number since 1945. The first sessions of the UN General Assembly now look like cozy, intimate gatherings. In fact, the UN overall then had fewer members than its Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has today! The various other types of actors add to the complexity, as do various coalitions of states. As one observer notes, “Large numbers . . . introduce a qualitatively different kind of diplomacy in international politics. The hallmark of this diplomacy is that it occurs between groups or coalitions of state actors” (Hampson 1995: 4). In addition, a central issue for many IGOs today is how to do a better job of incorporating nonstate actors in processes of global governing since “securing agreement of government officials is not enough to permit the smooth running of these institutions” (O’Brien et al. 2000: 208).

Greater numbers of players (and coalitions of players) mean multiple interests, multiple rules, issues, and hierarchies that are constantly in flux. These all complicate the processes of multilateral diplomacy and negotiation—of finding common ground for reaching agreements on collective action, norms, or rules. Managing complexity has become a key challenge for diplomats and other participants in multilateral settings. For example, UN-sponsored conferences have several thousand delegates from up to 191 countries, speaking through interpreters in English, French, Russian, Chinese, Spanish, and Arabic. There are hundreds of NGOs and numerous private citizens. As one veteran noted, “They are all interested in the subject matter under discussion, all want to be kept informed of every detail, and all have the possibility of being present at almost all of the sessions” (McDonald 1993: 249).

Although the universe of multilateral diplomacy is diverse, there is actually a high degree of similarity in the structures of most IGOs and in the types of decisionmaking processes used. Let us look at key patterns in how decisions get made in IGOs and other settings.

How Do Decisions Get Made?
Historically, since IGOs have been created by states, the principle of sovereign equality has dictated one-state, one-vote decisionmaking. Indeed, until well into the twentieth century, all decisions had to be unanimous as states would not accept the concept of majority decisionmaking. This is often cited as one of the sources of failure for the League of Nations.
An alternative principle accords greater weight to some states on the basis of population or wealth and results in weighted or qualified voting. In the IMF and World Bank, for example, votes are weighted according to financial contribution. In the European Union’s Council of Ministers, qualified majority voting applies to issues where the EU has supranational authority over member states. The number of votes for each state is based on population; the number of votes required to pass legislation ensures that the largest states must have support of some smaller states; and neither the smaller states alone nor fewer than three large states can block action. Another form of qualified majority voting prevails in the UN Security Council where the five permanent members each possess a veto and all must concur (or not object) for decisions to be taken.

Since the 1980s, much of the decisionmaking in the UN General Assembly, Security Council, and other bodies, as well as in global conferences, the World Trade Organization, and many other multilateral settings has taken the form of consensus. “Pressure toward consensus,” Courtney Smith (1999: 173) notes, “now dominates almost all multilateral efforts at global problem solving.” The puzzle, he suggests, is “how an organization that is composed of 185 [sic] member states, influenced by numerous non-governmental organizations, lobbied by multinational corporations, and serviced by an international secretariat reconciles all of these potentially diverse interests in search of a consensus on the most pressing issues of the day.” Key variables in consensus building are leadership; small, formal negotiating groups; issue characteristics (including issue salience to different actors); various actor attributes such as economic or military power or ability to serve as brokers; the amount and quality of informal contacts among actors; and personal attributes of participants such as intelligence, tolerance, patience, reputation, negotiating skills, creativity, and linguistic versatility. Let us look briefly at two of these: leadership and actor strategies. In Chapter 7, we also explore the role of culture and negotiating style.

Leadership
One unique feature of multilateral diplomacy is that leadership can come from diverse sources: powerful and not-so-powerful states, a coalition of states, an NGO or coalition of NGOs, or a skillful individual diplomat. Leadership can involve putting together a winning coalition to secure agreement on a new international trade agreement; it may involve the skill of negotiating a treaty text acceptable to industry, NGOs, and key governments. It may be the efforts of a transnational group of NGOs and college students publicizing an issue such as sweatshops and getting companies to change their behavior. It may involve a government’s (or any other actor’s) willingness to act first—to commit monetary resources to a program, to change trade laws, or to renounce development of a new weapons system.
Leadership in multilateral diplomacy can also be a UN secretary-general calling attention to an issue and prodding various other actors to do something, as Kofi Annan did in proposing the Global Compact with corporations and other UN responses to the social and economic challenges to globalization.

Actor Strategies
The nature of the multilateral arena means that actors cannot just present their individual positions on an issue and then sit down. Delegates must actively engage in efforts to discern the flexibility or rigidity of their respective positions. They must build personal relationships in order to establish the trust essential to working together. Some states (and NGOs) will take a stronger interest in particular topics than others; some will come with specific proposals; some will be represented by individuals with greater familiarity or expertise on a topic than others; some will be represented by individuals with little or no experience in multilateral diplomacy while others have long experience; and some states’ positions will matter more than others because of their relative power in the international system, in a given region, or on a particular issue. The face-to-face interactions of the individuals representing participating states are what caucusing is all about. It may take place at the back of the General Assembly hall, in the delegates’ dining room, in a hotel lobby bar, at receptions hosted by particular countries, in the restrooms, or in the corridors surrounding the official meeting place.

A hallmark of multilateral diplomacy is the formation of groups or coalitions of states and, increasingly in many contexts, coalitions of NGOs. Coalitions are a way of managing large numbers of participants. States can pool their power and resources to try to obtain a better outcome than they might by going it alone. Just banding together is not enough, however. Group members must negotiate among themselves to agree on a common position; they must maintain cohesion, prevent defections to rival coalitions, and choose representatives to bargain on their behalf. At some point, crosscutting coalitions need to be formed if agreement is to be reached with other parties. Often, it is small states or middle powers that exercise key bridging roles. For example, during the Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations in the early 1990s, a group of countries called the “Cairns Group,” led by Canada, Australia, and Argentina, helped to resolve sharp disagreements between the United States and the EU over agricultural trade.

Very early in the UN’s history, regional groups formed to elect nonpermanent representatives to the Security Council and other bodies. The Cold War produced two competing groups under the leadership of the Soviet Union and United States as well as a growing group of nonaligned coun-
tries. In 1964, Latin American, African, and Asian states formed the Group of 77 (G-77) that remains an active part of UN politics today. Since the mid-1960s, group diplomacy has been pervasive throughout much of the UN system. Other groups are discussed in Chapter 7.

A further actor strategy is the creation of networks to achieve greater policy coherence in the face of the challenges globalization poses. As Ruggie (2003: 301) notes, “Globalization . . . is all about interconnections. . . . The complex interrelatedness of issues and the cumulative, often unforeseen, consequences demand far greater policy coherence than the existing system of national and international institutions has been able to muster.” Networks are horizontal associations of diverse actors that operate on the basis of shared normative and conceptual frameworks and the awareness that shared goals cannot be achieved by actors on their own. A network approach is a key strategy for many NGOs. Increasingly, it is being utilized for a variety of issues and problems at the heart of global efforts to address the governance challenges of HIV/AIDS (Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) and the Internet as discussed in Chapter 12. It is being used in efforts to promote a common set of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) across the entire UN system (Ruggie 2003).

The Politics and Effectiveness of Global Governance

The politics of global governance reflects “struggles over wealth, power, and knowledge” in the world (C. Murphy 2000: 798). Thus, U.S. power and preferences shaped, and continue to shape, many of the pieces of global governance, especially the liberal international economic system, and ensures that U.S. interests (and often European as well) are accommodated in many regimes.

Power: Who Gets What?

Power and influence in global governance, however, does not belong just to powerful states or coalitions of states. Susan Strange (1996: 54), along with others, has noted that “TNCs have come to play a significant role in who-gets-what in the world system.” Jessica Mathews (1997), writing about the proliferation of NGOs, refers to a “power shift” to draw attention to their growing influence. The question of how to provide representation in multilateral decisionmaking or some more systematic means of input for key nonstate actors is an important one.

South African Peter Vale (1995), however, argues that economic liberalism and the increased influence of multilateral institutions has only intensified “market-driven poverty” for the vast majority of Africans, Eastern Europeans, and others whose states are failing. The widening inequality
between rich and poor, the failure to address growing environmental crises, concerns about labor conditions in many areas of the world, and other shortfalls of contemporary global governance have provoked a lively debate about the politics of global governance and, in particular, the “who gets what” and “who benefits” questions. For many, contemporary pieces of global governance are “Too geographically unbalanced, dominated by the largest economies . . . Most small and poor developing countries are excluded, as are people’s organizations . . . The structures and processes for global policy-making are not representative . . . There are no mechanisms for making ethical standards and human rights binding for corporations and individuals, not just governments” (UNDP 1999: 8). For some, then, the politics of global governance is about U.S. power and dominant coalitions. For others, it is about not only who gets included in decisionmaking, but also who gets excluded (and at what price). We borrow from Ronnie Lipschutz (1997: 83) a useful set of questions regarding governance: “Who rules? Whose rules? What rules? What kind of rules? At what level? In what form? Who decides? On what basis?” And, who benefits? Answers to these questions will emerge in subsequent chapters, but first we examine three critical challenges: legitimacy, accountability, and effectiveness.

### Legitimacy

In the earlier discussion of international law, we touched briefly on the question of why states comply. This question goes to the heart of a fundamental characteristic of power, governance, and rules more generally: namely, how the characteristic of legitimacy leads actors to obey rules without coercion. Thomas Franck in *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations* (1990: 24) defines legitimacy as “a property of a rule or rulemaking institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.” Some would add that a rule must also be perceived as just to be considered legitimate. As Franck notes, the “compliance pull” of rules and institutions varies widely, meaning that legitimacy “must be a matter of degree” (26). One way this distinction has been expressed internationally is through the concepts of hard and soft law discussed earlier.

A key aspect of legitimacy in the international system is membership in the international community whose system of multilateral, reciprocal interactions helps to validate its members, institutions, and rules. International institutions like the UN, for example, are perceived as legitimate to the extent that they are created and function according to certain principles of right process such as one-state, one-vote. The UN Security Council’s legitimacy as the core institution in the international system
imbued with authority to authorize the use of force derives from the widespread acceptance of that role, but as we will discuss in Chapter 4, that legitimacy is also under challenge. As political theorists have long noted, flags and rituals are important symbols of legitimate authority. Thus, when peacekeeping forces wear UN blue helmets, they symbolize the international community’s desire to preserve a ceasefire in hostilities. Since their coercive power is severely limited, it is their token presence that induces states and other actors to comply. As Franck (1990: 205) explains, “It is because states constitute a community that legitimacy has the power to influence their conduct.”

With many nonstate actors and an increasingly vocal civil society demanding a voice, the question of who participates in global governance touches on a fundamental issue of legitimacy. If IGOs’ decisionmaking processes exclude civil society or marginalize the voice of small, poor states, does that undermine the legitimacy and viability of these institutions? In Chapters 4 and 6, we explore the issue of NGO participation in particular.

**Accountability**

As a result of the diffusion of domestic democratic norms into the international arena, international institutions also have faced growing demands for greater accountability, gender balance in staffing, and transparency. Some of these demands come from NGOs and civil society groups; others from democratic governments. As Keohane and Nye (2000: 27) note, “International bureaucrats are more remote than national bureaucracies. The chain of connection to elections is more indirect.” Even if delegates to international conferences and IGO meetings come from democratic governments and are instructed by and accountable to elected officials, the conferences and meetings may well be closed to the public and operate more like private clubs. The World Bank, World Trade Organization, and IMF have particularly been charged with operating in secrecy. Likewise, there is an active debate over the “democratic deficit” in EU institutions. (See Chapter 5.)

Critical to insuring accountability and effectiveness is transparency. Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes (1995: 22) argue that transparency—“the generation and dissemination of information about the requirements of the regime and the parties’ performance under it—is an almost universal element of management strategy . . . [that] influences strategic interactions among parties . . . in the direction of compliance.” In some cases, the lack of transparency has been a key to the efficacy of some institutions, usually highly specialized ones such as trade and telecommunications, ensuring that participating governmental ministers could reach decisions absent out-
side political pressures. But the concerns about legitimacy, accountability, and transparency are not limited to IGOs; they apply equally to many NGOs. A fundamental problem for multilateral cooperation and global governance in the future, then, is how to increase transparency and accountability without undermining the very conditions that made dealmaking possible.

Effectiveness: Measuring Success and Failure

A third critical challenge involves the effectiveness of governance and the success or failure of different approaches to addressing needs and problems. As Simmons and de Jonge Oudraat (2001: 13–14) note, “Effectiveness goes beyond formal compliance; parties may come into compliance with agreements effortlessly for a time and without undertaking any measures that change behavior or contribute to solving the problem. Agreements themselves may not be ambitious enough to provide more than temporary or cosmetic relief of global problems.” The key question is: “What works?” “The complexity of international issues, their overlapping nature, and the turmoil of the arena in which they surface defy tidy theorizing about effective management.” There are many points of view and interests to be reconciled, shifting politics, and uncertainties about the efficacies of different policy alternatives.

In assessing effectiveness, several key questions may be asked. Who does what to translate agreements into action, including incorporating norms into domestic laws? Which techniques or mechanisms work best to get targeted actors to change their behavior? And what reactions are there to noncompliance? Who provides incentives or technical assistance to get developing countries to comply with environmental rules? Which actors employ diplomacy or public shaming, impose economic sanctions, or employ military force to punish failure to comply? And what is the outcome? How are people actually affected by the pieces of global governance? The task of assessing effectiveness is one of the central challenges in public policymaking, whether at local, national, regional, or global levels of politics and governance.

The challenges of global governance, then, include a variety of international policy problems and issues that require governance. Many pieces are not necessarily global in scope. Rather, what we see is a multilevel and often very diffuse system of pieces of governance with many different actors playing key roles alongside states. The need for more pieces of governance is clearly rising with globalization and other developments; the processes are complex; the politics, even in a world with a single superpower, is an ongoing struggle to control “who gets what”; and the issues of legitimacy, accountability, and effectiveness require constant attention.
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